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INTRODUCTION. 
Long before Alan Turing laid the foundations of the ongoing artificial intelligence 
project with all its computer-scientific and philosophical consequences and side effects,1 
we can find in a short but intellectually dense booklet by the German biologist, bio-
and-psycho-philosopher and philosopher of science, Hans Driesch, the following 
noteworthy remark: ‘It is conceivable that once a great technician of the future might 
reproduce the internal state of a brain at one moment; according to our doctrine there 
would not be 'on the other side' any corresponding state of a conscious having.’2 The 
ongoing philosophical disputes about the possibility or impossibility of 'strong artificial 
intelligence', with well-known participants such as John Searle and Roger Penrose, 
provides sufficient reason and motivation to look once again at what Hans Driesch had 
told us approximately a century ago. From his many books and essays I have chosen 
"Leib und Seele – Eine Untersuchung über das psychophysische Grundproblem" (1st:1916, 3rd:1923) 
for this review,3 specifically because of that book's persistent relevance for the ongoing 
discourses in the philosophy of computing and AI. These contemporary AI-
philosophical discourses are –at least in part– characterised by the occasional re-
emergence of naive mapping models for mental and mechanical 'states' which Driesch had 
convincingly refuted already two decades before the first Turing-equivalent freely 
programmable digital computers were electro-mechanically or fully electronically 
implemented – long before the linguist Searle came up with this famous 'Chinese 
Room' argument,4 and long before mathematical physicists like Penrose attacked the 
position of 'strong' AI by means of an intellectual pincer manoeuvre with Gödel's 
incompleteness theorems on the one flank and quantum physics on the other.5 
Unlike the self-proclaimed anti-metaphysicists during Driesch's life-time (such as 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, members of the Viennese Circle, etc.), who all 
attempted to 'overcome' metaphysics (without being ultimately able to achieve that 
goal), Driesch did not shy away from metaphysics in a suitable, modern, science-
compatible style. Metaphysics is classically, at least since Christian Wolff,6 divided into 
                                                             
1 See, for example, the journal: Minds and Machines. 
2 My own translation from the German original: "Leib und Seele" (3rd ed.), 2nd part, sect. I.2, p. 90. 
3 In its English translation the book has appeared as "Mind and Body", which is very unfortunate for two 
reasons: first of all, the positions in the title have been swapped –in Driesch's original book title the body 
comes first, whereas in the English title the body comes last– and secondly, the 'mind' is something 
completely different from what Driesch understands a 'soul'. The correct English translation of the book 
title would have been: 'body and soul' (because the 'soul' is not the 'mind'), such that I shall mostly refer to 
the book as Leib und Seele in the remainder of this review article. 
4 John Searle: Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, pp. 417-424, 1980. 
5 Roger Penrose: The Emperor's New Mind, 1989. 
6 Christian Wolff: Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, 1730. 
 STEFAN GRUNER 403 
two parts: general versus special metaphysics. General metaphysics (in its classical 
definition) deals with being-as-such insofar it is (i.e.: pure ontology), whereas special 
metaphysics deals with being insofar as it shows itself  to particular realms of  philosophical 
inquiry.7 A list of examples of special metaphysics includes: 
• Theoretical theology (Being insofar it is God), 
• Transcendental logics and psycho-philosophy (Being insofar it is Think-Soul), 
• Philosophy of nature (Being insofar it is Material Substance and Process), 
• Philosophical anthropology (Being insofar it is Human), 
• Theoretical biology (Being insofar it is Life),8 
whereby all these special metaphysics are still 'abstract' and 'general' and 'philosophical' 
enough to distinguish themselves from the particular sciences (which have historically 
'emerged' out of those metaphysics) dedicated to those topics: in the particular sciences 
the methods of inquiry are to a larger extent empirical (than in the purely rational 
metaphysics) and already take a number of basis concepts for granted (e.g.: 'life') which 
would still be in need of philosophical clarification in some special metaphysics which 
is conceptually positioned 'on top of ' its corresponding particular science. 
Having started as an empirical biologist by education, Driesch soon became a 
'fully-fledged' philosopher and special metaphysicist,9 with noteworthy contributions 
especially to the metaphysics of life (bio-philosophy) and the metaphysics of mind and 
soul (psycho-philosophy) – thereby always in full awareness of the latest empirical 
findings in the corresponding particular sciences: biology and psychology. A number of 
publications on Ethics –something Heidegger explicitly refused to produce– completed 
Driesch's philosophical oeuvre. Around the age of 40, in February 1906, Driesch was 
appointed as ‘Gifford Lecturer’ (Scotland) on the topics of theoretical biology and 
philosophy. In spite of his early Gifford appointment (as well several further positions 
and honorary awards of  international prestige, invited lectures in China and Japan, 
etc.), Driesch was and remained to some extent ignored in his German-speaking heimat 
land. For example, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927) does not mention Driesch at all, 
although both Heidegger and Driesch were –to some extent, and in their own 
particular way– Husserlians, although both of them were working on related topics – 
see particularly $10 in ‘Sein und Zeit’,10 and although the works of both Driesch and 
                                                             
7 Ernst Vollrath: Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Metaphysica specialis. 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 16/2, pp. 258-284, 1962. 
8 Not to be confused with the practical Lebensphilosophie which deals with the matters of everyday human 
existence. 
9 Hans Driesch: Wirklichkeitslehre – Ein metaphysischer Versuch, 1916 (1st),  1922 (2nd). 
10 Martin Heidegger: Die Abgrenzung der Daseinsanalytik gegen Anthropologie, Psychologie und Biologie, s10 in Sein 
und Zeit, 1927. 
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Heidegger pointed to a considerably large number of the same 'external' authors as 
literature references – see, for comparison, the Appendix at the bottom of this review. 
Also Popper's Logik der Forschung (1935) does not provide any reference to Driesch at all, 
although Popper's work was declared by its sub-title to be an "epistemology of the 
modern natural science" in general,11 not alone of physics in particular (to which modern 
natural science Driesch had already made significant contributions as experimental 
biologist), although it had been Driesch who had founded and established the 
discipline of Theoretical Biology and had coined the notion of a 'biological system' 
within that new discipline, and although Driesch had already five years before Popper 
published a book on philosophy of science and epistemology of research.12 As a matter 
of fairness I ought to add that Driesch's work was generally well received among –for 
example– faith-bound philosophers of Catholic confession.13 Because of his democratic 
and pacifist political attitude, Driesch was pressured by the NS regime to resign from 
his academic chair during the 3rd Reich, and died during the 2nd World War in 
Leipzig, 1941; the epitaph "His Life was Wisdom, and Goodness" was inscribed on his 
tombstone.14 Ten years after the 2nd World War, the German Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie (Dictionary of Philosophy) of 1955 lists Driesch very briefly a as neo-vitalist,15 
(in contrast to the classical vitalism of 1750-1850 before materialism became dominant), 
but does not mention at all Driesch's many contributions to various other branches of 
philosophy, in particular: the philosophy of perceiving and knowing (epistemology), the 
philosophy of mind, the science-philosophy of psychology, moreover moral philosophy 
and philosophical ethics, in which Driesch's initial biological theme does not stand in 
the foreground of attention. 
 
idealism ↔ materialism ↔ 
vitalism 
Fig.1: the two different opponents of materialism. 
Driesch was, like Bergson (whom he cited several times), a 'critical' –not a naive– 
                                                             
11 Karl Popper: Logik der Forschung – Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Schriften zur 
wissenschaftlichen, Weltauffassung 9, Springer Publishers, 1935.  
12 Hans Driesch: Philosophische Forschungslehre, 1930. 
13 An affirmative reference to Jesus can be found in chapter 3g) of Driesch's book Die Logik als Aufgabe.  
14 "Sein Leben war Weisheit und Güte" – see P.: Hans Driesch, Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 74/1, 
p. 107, Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät der Universität Innsbruck, 1952.  
15 Johannes Hoffmeister (ed.): Vitalismus, p. 649 in Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe,  1955 (2nd). 
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vitalist. "These critical vitalists" [Driesch and Bergson] "distinguished from 'naive' 
vitalists who posit as the source of life a spiritual force or soul, understand nature as 
more than a machine and in principle beyond calculation, even as they remain 
committed to scientific knowledge".16 Thus, though not anti-scientific, critical vitalism 
is anti-reductionist – in contrast, for example, to the epistemological 'atomism' 
advocated by the Viennese Circle, and in stark contrast to Wittgenstein's wrathful 
attitude of 'explaining away' almost all interesting philosophical problems as so-called 
'pseudo-problems' in his 'therapeutic' anti-philosophy. After a critical 'History and 
Theory of Vitalism' was written by Driesch already before the First World War,17 our 
book of interest on Leib und Seele reconfirms this critical attitude in a differentiating and 
self-distinguishing footnote to pages 104-105, in which Driesch refuted the inappropriate 
conflation of psychological and nature-theoretical issues committed by other "so-called" 
vitalists. Closely related to this issue is the philosophical 'school' and theme of  
psychovitalism –not to be confused with the epistemological doctrine of psychologism 
(Wundt, Lipps, Ziehen: see Appendix)– as a special 'branch' of Neovitalism in which 
philosophical notions like life-force and soul-force are systematically integrated.18 
Psychologism as a doctrine or 'school' was not only rejected by the phenomenologists 
(Husserl) and Logicists (Frege), but also by critical vitalists like Driesch who, only a few 
years after Leib und Seele, dedicated a whole book (not merely an essay) to The Crisis in 
Psychology (1925). 
RECAPITULATION OF THE BOOK LEIB UND SEELE. 
What I am reviewing in the following is the 2nd edition (3rd imprint) of Leib und Seele, 
which adds to the only critical treatise of the 1st edition a constructive part which had not 
been part of the 1st edition. In other words: whereas the 1st edition of Leib und Seele 
merely attempted a refutation of competing theories on the matter at hand, the 2nd 
edition also presented Driesch's own philosophical counter-theory against those 
erstwhile refuted theories. Early critiques of Driesch's Leib und Seele book, which were 
published in the English as well as in the German language already in the 1920s, can 
                                                             
16 Alan van Wyk: What Matters Now? Cosmos and History 8/2, pp. 130-136, 2012. 
17 H. Driesch: The History and Theory of Vitalism. Revised and in part re-written for the English 
edition, authorised Translation by C.K. Ogden, Macmillan & Co. Publ., 1914. 
18 A critical remark by Driesch against naive psychovitalism as a too naive pseudo-
alternative against materialism can be found in a footnote to chapter 6a) of his book Die Logik 
als Aufgabe. 
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still be easily accessed in the public domain.19 Driesch himself conceded in his foreword 
of Leib und Seele that a treatise on the body-soul-problem belongs to the most difficult 
tasks in philosophy by-and-large, as it requires prior knowledge in logic,20 psychology, 
the natural sciences, and especially also in 'phenomenology'. But, as Driesch stated in 
his foreword, these difficult efforts are well worth the while, because they are located at 
the centre of questions concerning the very essence of 'human being', and –as we might 
add, at present they are perhaps also at the centre of the 'trans-humanist' questions of 
the 21st century concerning the possibility of 'artificial intelligence' and 'artificial life'. 
If we 'abstract away' from the details of Driesch's elaborations, his book Leib und 
Seele can be recapitulated as follows.  
FIRST PART. 
Chapter I. 
First, Driesch summarizes the 'usual doctrine' (with its several variations) of the 
'psycho-physical parallelism' – a doctrine of dualism about two separate 'realms' of 
existence: body and soul. In Driesch's own summary, the doctrine of psycho-physical 
parallelism would assert that everything psychical can be completely 'mapped' (without 
residue) onto what is physical, and what is 'physical' is ultimately nothing more than a 
mechanical or energetic or electro-dynamic system. Driesch then continues to analyse 
a number of different philosophical vantage points from which that doctrine can be 
beheld: 'genuine metaphysics' (in which it is possible to accept that doctrine), his own 
Ordnungslehre (in which it is possible to 'speak about' that doctrine in a modal way of 
'considerable possibilities'), however not in philosophical systems such like Berkeley's 
("esse est percipi") in which already the problematic question concerning 'psycho-
physical parallelism' cannot be meaningfully formulated. Thereafter Driesch raises the 
question whether this 'psycho-physical parallelism' can be treated in rebus, or whether 
this problem can be treated only in the realm of concepts, words and 'postulates' – at 
which point Driesch enters into an excursion through his Ordnungslehre ('doctrine of 
order') which we might nowadays call a 'system of semantics'. Anyway, the goals are: to 
treat the given problem as a problem in rebus, and to check the doctrine of 'psycho-
                                                             
19 A review by Julius Schultz: Annalen der Philosophie 3/1, pp. 124-126, 1923, judges Driesch's intended 
phenomenological anti-dogmatism in Leib und Seele as "itself dogmatic". A review by Percy Hughes: The 
Journal of Philosophy 26/7, pp. 192-195, 1929, claims that Driesch's is a "method of enquiry that neither 
enriches philosophy nor clarifies science". A review by G. Watts Cunningham: The Philosophical Review 
38/2, pp. 182-184, 1929, offers some words of praise for the book's main intent, but complains that "there 
is too much of a tendency exhibited here to lean upon the barren argument from analogy". 
20 Driesch's notion of 'logic' differs strongly from our current notion of 'logic'; see below for further details. 
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physical parallelism' both with regard to its factual correctness and even with regard to 
the mere possibility of its correctness. Then follows a string of arguments against what 
Driesch called 'categorial dogmatism' – i.e.: any doctrines which would stipulate a 
'necessary truth' of the psycho-physical parallelism on the basis of any metaphysical 
principles that are to be believed 'universally' without any further justification 
concerning relevant details or specific differences. By contrast, Driesch wants to tackle 
the given problem on the basis of (Husserl's) phenomenology, i.e.: by means of a 'gazing 
turn towards the things themselves',21 whereby the 'things themselves' in question are 
here: the things psychical (soul) and the things physical (nature). Then, after another 
excursion into his Ordnungslehre concerning the semantics of the term 'soul', Driesch 
posits the question of concern: What can we 'see' when we 'gaze' at the 'essential 
structure' of whatever we may 'experience',22 and does the result of such gazing –in 
comparison against the 'structure' of what is mechanical– allow us to accept the 
doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism? 
Chapter II. 
After having posited this question, Driesch presented an excursion into the history of 
ideas (history of philosophy) with a summary of historic arguments in favour or against 
that doctrine, and criticized all of them –the historic 'pro' arguments as well as the 
historic 'contra' arguments– as being more or less insufficient for some or other 
philosophical or empirical reason. 
Chapter III. 
In order to 'approach the things themselves' according to the doctrine of 
phenomenology, which are here: the things psychical ('soul'), Driesch then went into a 
long excursion through the field of scientific (empirical) psychology as far as it was 
known to him in those days, thereby citing and commenting various results published 
by German-writing psychologists of the era such as Kries, Schwarz, Becher, or 
                                                             
21 'Gazing' is my own translation of Driesch's German term 'schauen', which comes close to the original 
meanings of the Greek theoria and Latin speculatio. However, because of to the semantic shifts in the 
connotations of the terms 'theory' and 'speculation' during the past centuries, I have decided not to use the 
term 'speculation' in my translation of the phenomenological 'schauen' – hence: 'gazing', which is however 
not a physical looking by means of the organic eyes; it is –so to say– a philosophical looking with the 
philosopher's 'inner eye' or the 'eye of the mind'. 
22 Driesch's German word for 'experience' is erleben, (not 'erfahren'). The German language recognizes a 
subtle difference between the notions of 'erleben' and 'erfahren'; both translate to the English 'experience' 
in which translation that subtle difference gets lost. For the sake of clarification: the erleben-type of 
experience is more subjective-internal, whereas the erfahren-type of experience is more objective-external. 
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Liebmann – see the complete list of names in the Appendix of this review. 
Chapter IV. 
In his earlier essay on 'The Soul as an Elementary Factor of Nature' (1903), Driesch 
had already presented an attempt against the problem of psycho-physical parallelism, 
namely in the context of the doctrine of the 'so-called vitalism'.23 There, Driesch had 
presented a philosophy of the human 'action' from a mainly naturalist point of view –
human actions as 'natural events'– without paying much attention to the things 
psychical (soul). There he had used the argument of the human actions for two 
purposes –in defence of vitalism as well as against psycho-physical parallelism– 
because: "a necessary consequence of  the usual parallelism is the doctrine of  an ubiquitously un-
interrupted chain of  mechanismic causality; who, however, denies the consequence of  a doctrine must 
logically also deny its premises".24 Now, however, Driesch re-visits his philosophy of human 
actions from a new vantage point in order to give it a psycho-philosophical 'twist': the 
purposeful human action is now beheld from the viewpoint of the soul rather than as 
'natural event'. This chapter also contains some particularly interesting remarks on 
what is the 'essence' of a 'machine' – a question that is of continued interest in the 
philosophy of 'trans-humanism' (as well as in the philosophy of computing). For 
example: "Surely there are the brain and the nervous system, and surely they are essentially 
important; and both of  them might be –although it seems unlikely, because of  the regulative capacities 
of  the brain functions– considered as an 'innate machine' in a purely physiological sense. However, this 
'machine' –in the widest sense of  the term, namely in a fixed prescribed arrangement of  physical-
chemical determinants of  Becoming ("factors of  nature") – would then not alone be all that is essential 
in that context, and whatever comes in addition as being essential cannot be a machine. Because the 
capacity to individually select individual incident stimuli for further usage, for the purpose of  anything 
that the carrier of  such capacity had received accidentally during the arbitrary course of  his own 
history, cannot be reconciled with the notion of  what is a machine",25 and subsequently Driesch 
                                                             
23 The critical phrase 'so-called' appears in Driesch's original text. 
24 My own translation from the German original; the argument is obviously presented in Modus Tollens. 
Indeed, Driesch uses Modus Tollens quite often as a logical tool of argumentation throughout the 
reviewed book. 
25 My own translation from the German original. Computer scientists –such as myself– may notice that 
Driesch's notion of 'machine' is a classical-mechanismic notion: he had to use this mechanismic notion of 
'machine' in order to point out the deficiencies of the doctrine of mechanism which he intended to 
criticize. By contrast, the notion of a Turing machine (in computer science) goes beyond what Driesch 
had conceptualized as 'machine'; the Turing machine possesses a 'memory' tape such that its future 
'behaviour' depends indeed on what the machine has 'remembered' in its past. However, Alan Turing 
published his ideas much later than Driesch, such that we cannot in fairness accuse Driesch of having 
'ignored' non-mechanismic 'machine' notions in his arguments against the doctrine of psycho-physical 
parallelism. 
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asked and challenged the engineers of the future "to construct a machine which is able to 
occasionally tell lies".26 In consequence, said Driesch, the acting human being is indeed a 
'thing of nature' (not above or beyond nature), but nevertheless a 'thing of nature' of a 
very special kind which is not the kind of the mechanismic machine; the specific 
difference between the one and the other must be understood in terms of the soul: 
"Have not I myself  on many occasions emphasised that the realms of  my soul and of  nature are 
strictly separated realms..., and that the concepts of  nature may never be conflated with psychological 
concepts...? And nevertheless it may be stated that human actions as natural events can be understood 
with help of  those above-mentioned concepts that stem from Phenomenology and Psychology... Thus, 
not on the basis of  those concepts, but rather with their help we understand those physical matters".27 
In other words: "There is not 'soul' which causes effects into 'nature', rather there are natural 
determinants of  becoming which work so as if  they were soul-ish". In the summary of Chapter 
IV,  Driesch is convinced that his philosophical analysis of the human action excludes 
as its result any mechanismic doctrine in this specific realm of life – once more a 
refutation argument in Modus Tollens. 
Chapter V. 
Next, Driesch embarks on a long voyage through the area of psychology as it was 
known to him in his own historic era. The chapter carries the title: "The Doctrine of 
the Composition of what is Psychical"28 and discusses various topics at the interface 
between empirical psychology and theoretical psychology, psycho-philosophy, 
philosophy of mind and epistemology, such as: what is "I", how do I "perceive", how 
do I "know", what is "in" the mind when I "think", etc. The main argument of this 
chapter states that whatever is psychical comprises a great manifold of 'mental 
elements' – a manifold much greater than the comparatively smaller manifold of the 
things natural. Hence there can be no bijective (1:1) 'mapping' between the things mental 
and the things natural, in contrast to what the 'usual' doctrine of psycho-physical 
parallelism (according to Driesch) had proclaimed – Modus Tollens in application 
again. 
                                                             
26 In other –more recent– words: a machine that would be able to pass the notorious 'Turing test'. By 
contrast, Driesch's own explicitly mentioned example of a 'machine' in Chapter IV of Leib und Seele was a 
'phonograph' of the type we can nowadays admire in museums. More than a decade later, in 1935, 
Driesch published a book specifically on that topic: Die Maschine und der Organismus, Barth Publ. 
27 My own translation from the German original. Notice the hermeneutical connotations in Driesch's 
notion of 'understanding' as 'verstehen'. 
28 German: Die Lehre vom Bau des Psychischen. 
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Chapter VI. 
Driesch closes the first part of his book with some further 'outlook' remarks about the 
wider applicability of his 'argument of the different manifolds' also in other fields of 
philosophy and ethics; those remarks need not be recapitulated in this review. 
SECOND PART. 
The impossibility of psycho-physical parallelism in its traditional forms (refuted as 
described above) leads to the question: which doctrine can reasonably be accepted as a 
substitute instead? As the (refuted) classical psycho-parallelism had been a dualist 
doctrine: will the acceptable substitute be a monist doctrine, or will it still be dualist in a 
different form? Would the acceptable doctrine perhaps be the 'classical' competitor 
doctrine of the 'mutual psycho-physical inter-action'? The argument towards Driesch's 
final conclusion of his book Leib und Seele takes the following turns. 
Chapter I. 
In this chapter, Driesch briefly outlines a theory of 'my body' as a natural body, its 
senses, its functions – with several references to the notions of 'entelechy' and 'psychoid' 
which Driesch had developed in some of his earlier 'vitalist' publications;29 thereby the 
'psychoid' is (simply put) the 'entelechy' in-so-far as it relates specifically to the above-
mentioned human actions. Consequently, the question concerning the relation 
between a 'psychoid' and its human brain re-arises, but must now not be answered in 
any of the previously refuted manners. This chapter also contains Driesch's above-
mentioned assertion: "It is conceivable that once a great technician of  the future might reproduce the 
internal state of  a brain at one moment; according to our doctrine there would not be 'on the other side' 
any corresponding state of  a conscious having", which Driesch sets out to justify further in the 
subsequent chapters of the Second Part. 
Chapter II. 
This chapter presents Driesch's analysis of the meaning of the term 'my soul', i.e.: 
"whether or not this term can actually signify anything with clarity".30 However, unlike the body, 
the soul is not anything visible – hence an acceptable notion of 'soul' must be 
'constructed' from philosophical 'first principles' which Driesch claims to find in the 
Husserlian methods of phenomenological 'gazing' – see above. In the remainder of this 
                                                             
29 Philosophie des Organischen. 
30 Here we can see in Driesch's writing an early example of a style of philosophising which later became 
the dominant style particularly in the Anglo-American philosophy after its so-called 'linguistic turn'.  
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second chapter, Driesch goes into many further details of meta-psychology (philosophy 
of psychology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, gnoseology, and the like) which leads 
him eventually –partly on the basis of literature citations, partly by phenomenological 
'introspection'– to the following quasi-definition: "Gazing I see that my Self, in its dis-
continuous There-Being, has a continuous foundation within the continuous time, and this is what I 
call my soul".31  In other words, it is all only "as if" – the introspective 'gazing' method of 
phenomenology does not permit any firmer assertions: "What 'is' now the soul? A specific 
realm of  Being, which we mean by way of  reference as a non-immediate object, which behaves like if  
it would exist independently for itself  as this specific one".32 By analogy, the same also holds for 
the notion of 'nature'. On these premises, the chapter eventually 'jumps' –not fully 
convincingly– to the conclusion that soul and nature are entirely separate realms of 
being: "Not can there be found any inter-active becoming nor causation between them".33 
Chapter III. 
This chapter, titled "The True Parallelism", consequently grapples with the still un-
answered question about how body and soul, or brain and 'psychoid', may now finally 
be related to each other – on the basis of the above-stated premises that 'no interactive 
becoming nor causation' can be found between the 'entirely separate realms' of body 
and soul, and that everything 'appears' only 'quasi as if ' to the 'gazing I' of the 
phenomenologist philosopher. The fact that such a mysterious relation must somehow 
be established is thereby a necessary consequence of the vitalist refutation of the 
                                                             
31 My own translation from the German original. I have called the statement of above a 'quasi-definition', 
(not a 'definition'), because of its deep immersion in a 'hermeneutic circle': the phenomenologically 'gazing 
I' postulates a notion of 'soul' on the basis of a likewise postulated notion of 'continuous time', which soul is 
then somehow accepted as a really effective 'driver' of the I and the Self. What was 'prior', the hen or the 
egg – the I or the soul? 
32 My own translation from the German original. Nowadays readers may notice the following similarity 
between Driesch's phenomenology and the later language-philosophy after the Anglo-American 'linguistic 
turn': both styles of philosophizing are ultimately unable to penetrate the veil between the philosopher 
and his external reality, albeit for different reasons: the phenomenologist is confined to the limits of the I 
in its solipsist 'gazing', whereas the language philosopher cannot escape the prison the walls made of 
words. In Driesch's philosophy we can already find an early 'mixture' of both styles – hence his frequent 
and almost self-apologetic usage of the un-assertive phrases: "it is as if", or: "it appears as if". 
33 Hence, Driesch cannot so easily be dubbed a 'psycho-vitalist', in contrast to E. Becher who appears in 
Driesch's list of references. For comparison see also the entry "Psychovitalism" in the German Wörterbuch 
der Philosophischen Begriffe (2nd: 1955), in which E. Becher is mentioned, too. Driesch himself complained in 
a footnote to his Chapter III that he had often been misunderstood in this context, possibly due to some 
shortage of conceptual clarity concerning the specific differences of the terms 'psychical' and 
'psychological'. 
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concept of mechanismically fully determined living (especially: human) bodies.34 
Driesch is honest enough at this point to speak openly (against the explicitly anti-
metaphysical attitude of his own philosophy-historic era from Nietzsche to Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein) of metaphysics: "my soul, in-so-far as it provides me with Conscious-Having, 
is metaphysically at the same time the same Something which causes effects into nature, as a factor of  
nature, in a non-mechanismic manner. In this ultimate insight, therein that I let my soul be the same as 
a certain Nature-Something of  non-mechanismic kind, resides what is metaphysical in my arguments – 
without which any type of  'parallelisation' would lack its deepest meaning".35 In summary Driesch 
can only 'hint' somewhat mysteriously at the following phenomenological-
psychological-natural triple-parallel correlations, which he regards as different aspects or 
different representations of what is ultimately one: 
 
Phenomenological 
Aspect 
Psycho-Philosophical Aspect Nature-Philosophical Aspect 
This my introspective 
state of Conscious- 
Having 
The state of my soul as a 
specific quasi-independent 
realm of Being 
The state of the non- 
mechanistic facture of 
nature which influences 
the Becoming of my body  
 
The chapter concludes with a non-exhaustive list of examples in order to illustrate 
several other correlations between the phenomenological and the psychological aspects 
of various 'mental things'. 
Chapters IV, V, VI. 
Similar to Chapter VI of the first part, Driesch did not finish his elaborations with the 
foregoing 'highlight' conclusion of his main argument; again he felt obliged to add a 
flurry of minor details and repetitive extra-explanations which appear as somewhat 
'tedious' and 'pedantic' when beheld from the vantage point of the present. In those 
three add-on chapters after the conclusion of his main argument, Driesch wrote 
comparatively about what we would nowadays call 'related work', including references 
to Lipps and Scheler, to the neo-Kantian Rickert, Husserl, Bergson, the psycho-
philosopher Wilhelm Wundt, etc.; he also included brief remarks about some 
similarities and differences between humans and animals, and the like. Today I can 
                                                             
34 If I may permit myself to utter one semi-serious tongue-in-cheek pun at this point: It appears to be as if 
it is difficult to be an anti-mechanismic vitalist and assertion-withholding phenomenologist at the same 
time. 
35 My own translation from the German original. 
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only guess that those 'pedantic' add-on-chapters IV, V, VI of the second part might 
perhaps have been written specifically in response to some academic conversations or 
collegial disputes which Driesch might have had in his 'daily business' as a chair 
professor and visiting professor to various German and overseas universities in those 
years. 
ADDITIONAL READING-HINTS. 
Driesch's particularly in its 'constructive' second part somewhat 'enigmatic' book on 
Leib und Seele, which I have recapitulated in the foregoing sections of this review, can be 
understood considerably better through background knowledge from Driesch's older 
Ordnungslehre, to which his Logic as Task booklet provides a summary-overview with 
some additional motivating and explaining comments. It is therefore in order at this 
point to browse cursorily through the pages of Driesch's Logic as Task,36 in order to 
provide the readers of this review with some (hopefully helpful) advice for a better 
understanding of Leib and Seele a century after its publication. All in all both books, 
Ordnungslehre and Logic as Task, make it reasonably clear that 'soul' is not understood by 
Driesch as anything 'metaphysical', because, according to Driesch,  
• no philosophy of knowledge (Erkenntnislehre, epistemology) is to be had without 
metaphysics (or in other words: knowledge about external entities outside the 
"I" must always have metaphysical components), 
• whilst the Ordnungslehre (in which 'soul' is postulated as a philosophical concept) 
is not metaphysics itself but rather some –so-to-say 'mind-clearing'– 
preparatory exercise (propaedeutic) before any further metaphysics can be 
                                                             
36 To avoid any misunderstanding it is important to recall at this point that Driesch's notion of 'logic' 
differs fundamentally from what we understand as 'logic' now, a century after Gottlob Frege. Driesch's 
notion of 'logic' was still the 'classical' philosophical notion of 'logic' from the long era before Frege, in 
which 'logic' had been understood as something which we might nowadays call 'conceptual semantics': some 
somehow sensibly or meaningfully ordered system of concepts and notions and categories with their 
various relations among each other, sub-concepts (more specific) and super-concepts (more general), the 
meaningful (semantic) 'unfolding' of new concepts out of already given concepts, their material 'contents' 
in relation to various ontic or ontological realms, and the like. Hegel, for example, held such a notion of 
'logic', too. By contrast: what we call 'logic' nowadays was in Driesch's era still known as 'logistic' –Driesch 
himself had used that term in his Ordungslehre– which, in turn, has nothing to do with the usual current 
meaning of 'logistic': Whereas 'logistic' in Driesch's era was –like 'logic'– derived from the Greek logos, 
nowadays 'logistic' is derived from the French logis = accommodation to which also the English words 
'lodge' and 'lodging' are related. In Leib und Seele Driesch did not mention his 'logic' with emphasis, 
however his 'logic' booklet highlights with great clarity the methodological premises on the basis of which all of 
his later books –including Leib und Seele– were written.   
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started.37 
In short: there had been a noteworthy development-in-thought between Driesch the biologist and 
bio-philosopher from the era of his Scottish Gifford Lectures, and Driesch the Husserlian 
phenomenologist thereafter.38 If these philosophical differences between those 'two Drieschs' 
(a number of continuities notwithstanding) are not properly taken into account –in his 
Ordnungslehre, for example, Driesch had referred to his own earlier philosophy of the 
Gifford era as 'popular philosophy', which implies a subtle self-accusation (of naivety)– 
then misunderstandings are coming to loom at every corner also as far as Driesch's 
book Leib und Seele is concerned. Indeed, Leib und Seele was still written by Driesch in the 
habitus of his pre-metaphysical Ordnungslehre whereby –due the above-mentioned 
absence of metaphysics– nothing can (yet) be known about the "as-if"-existence of souls as 
independent external entities.39 In current terms, Driesch's Ordnungslehre may be 
regarded as a work of 'semantics' rather than of the philosophy of nature in its 
traditional sense. Driesch stated in a preface that his Ordnungslehre was both inspired by 
(the motifs and deficiencies of) Kant's system of 'categories' (in which notions appear to 
the rational mind as 'necessarily given'), as well as by (the motifs and deficiencies of) 
Hegel's system of 'dialectics' (in which notions are intended to 'evolve' out of each 
other). All in all, Driesch was thus one of the very last 'systematic' philosophers of 
German language after Kant and Hegel before 'systematic' philosophizing as a whole 
fell by-and-large out of fashion due to its notorious pitfalls and infeasibilities. 
From Driesch's Logik als Aufgabe I now 'extract' very briefly and concisely a few key 
statements which support and clarify my remarks of above. Driesch, citing Augustine 
and Descartes, considers the 'triune' sentence "I am aware of  something", the meaning of 
which needs to be clarified, as the starting point of all philosophy, and its clarification 
                                                             
37 From this perspective we can compare Driesch's motivating intent 'behind' his Ordnungslehre with Kant's 
motivation 'behind' his well-known Prolegomena zu einer jeglichen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten 
können. Driesch's and Kant's motivations and purposes seem to be very similar at this particular point 
although their actual books are, of course, very different; in his Ordnungslehre Driesch gives several 
references to Kant. 
38 We may compare that to Heidegger's Kehre, or to Wittgenstein's turn-away from his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus towards his later Untersuchungen. 
39 By comparison: this not identical with the spirit-realism professed by the well-known Austrian physicist 
Erwin Schrödinger, who had in 1943 concluded: Because my body functions as pure mechanism 
according to the laws of nature, and because I know from my own experience that I myself am the one 
who coordinates my body's motions, there must exist a Person-I which coordinates the motions of my 
atoms in accordance with the laws of nature. Formally-structurally the arguments by Driesch and 
Schrödinger are very similar; however Schrödinger has metaphysically reified what Driesch had qualified 
with his phenomenological "as-if". The earlier (naive-'popular') 'Driesch the bio-philosopher', with his 
Aristotelian 'entelechy', however, might as well have argued as Erwin Schrödinger (without the qualifying 
"as-if"). 
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as the genuine 'philosophia prima'. During its very first clarification, which is still un-
methodological, arises the possibility of a conceptual 'philosophy of order' which 
Driesch used to call 'logic' in the widest possible pre-Fregean sense of the term; (we 
nowadays might perhaps call it 'natural semantics'). The question of knowledge does 
not yet arise at that point: a 'metaphysical' theory of knowledge (epistemology) 
becomes possible only after the clarifying preparatory 'philosophy of order' has come to 
its conclusion; at this early point we do not yet 'know' anything when we understand 
the term 'knowing' in the sense of all classical epistemology. We already possess a 
'mysterious anticipation' of the possibility of 'order', which anticipation is irreducible 
(i.e.: cannot be analysed to any lower-level components) and which the 'philosophy of 
order' merely brings explicitly into the light of our philosophical awareness.40 This pre-
knowledge is mysteriously given to us – we simply 'find' it, without our own doing in 
our awareness, and we already use this 'tacit'41 knowledge while making it 
philosophically explicit. The un-methodological quasi-'method' of producing the 
'philosophy of order' is the 'gazing' introspection which Husserl had called 
phenomenology, from which any further philosophical results are obtained – including 
even the laws of conclusion ('logic' in the strict sense of the term) which can then be 
used in all further processes of philosophical thinking. Phenomenology is thus the 
foundation of both the preparatory 'philosophy of order' and the –systematically much 
'later' positioned– (special, particular) science of (empirical) psychology. Driesch's 
philosophy has thus, in his own words, a 'methodologically solipsist' basis. All this, 
however, is not to be confused with any classical 'psychologism' at the basis of 
philosophy,42 because this would already pre-suppose some naive-realist metaphysics 
from which the beginning of the preparatory 'philosophy of order' is still a long way off. 
Equally dogmatic, according to Driesch, would be any doctrine of 'consciousness as 
such' or 'absolute consciousness' assumed at the very beginning of the process of 
philosophizing. By means of the pre-methods and methods described above, the 
philosopher 'posits' all the relevant philosophical fundamental notions (such as: 
'thought', 'idea', 'abstraction', 'order', 'category', 'logical conclusion', 'classification', 
                                                             
40 In the language of Gadamer we could call this situation a 'hermeneutic cycle'. Driesch was fully aware 
of the cyclicality of this initial situation, although he did not yet possess the keywords of the later 
Gadamer's transcendental hermeneutics. 
41 if I may use the later Polanyi's term at that point for the sake of clarification. 
42 Psychologism was a popular 'school' of philosophy in the late 19th century when the particular science 
of psychology began to separate itself from philosophy as a new science in its own right. The doctrine of 
psychologism stated that the science of psychology is the foundation-science of and for all other sciences, 
philosophy also included. Husserl and Frege –in their own different ways– were the most prominent anti-
psychologists in those days.  
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'time', 'becoming', 'nature', 'soul', 'causality', 'free will', 'goodness', and the like), which 
appear to the 'gazing I' as if they were authoritatively postulated as correct and consistent by 
and from some mysterious external source to which the 'gazing I' does not possess any 
immediate gnostic access.43 As soon as those fundamental notions are 'labeled' by some 
specific order-'signs' as 'had', they can later be used and re-used for further intellectual 
or scientific purposes. Thereby, 'correctness' and 'consistency' belong to the 
preparatory 'philosophy of order' and must be sharply distinguished from the notion of 
(external) 'truth' which belongs to a (later) external-metaphysical epistemology – i.e.: 
after the 'break-through' into a world-realm beyond the walls of the methodological 
solipsism. In this context, Driesch also distinguished as sharply as possible between 
thought-objects of 'first' (immediate) and 'second' (mediated) order, whereby the latter 
ones can be 'meant by' the first ones as (semantic) reference objects.44 To the 
phenomenologically 'gazing I' those second-order reference objects –including notions 
like 'nature' or 'soul'– are meant to denote something which appears to the 'gazing I' as 
something quasi-independent and quasi-external.45 Those thought-objects of first order 
are order-philosophically grouped by Driesch into a ('posited') philosophical realm of 
pure 'there-being' (phenomenology), whilst the thought-objects of second order (which 
can function as semantic reference objects to those first ones) are grouped into the 
three following ('posited') further philosophical realms: 'nature' (philosophy of nature 
and natural sciences), 'soul' (psycho-philosophy, philosophy of mind, scientific-
empirical psychology), and 'the absolute' (metaphysics and philosophical ontology – not 
to be confused with the preparatory-philosophical Ordnungslehre itself):46 "My soul –so says 
                                                             
43 Here is another 'hermeneutic cycle': Something mysterious seems to 'force' the 'gazing I' of the order-
philosopher to posit (or postulate) conceptually the notion of 'soul', which can later –metaphysically– be 
connected semantically with that mysterious something as the postulated notion's object of reference. In 
the 'pure' philosophy of order, however, this semantic link is not yet explicitly possible and 
methodologically not yet allowed.   
44 Driesch himself did not use the terms 'semantics' and 'reference object'; I have decided to use these 
terms interpretively, such as to make those complicated thoughts of Driesch better understandable for 
contemporary readers.  
45 Remember that Driesch had been a biologist, an 'empirically' working natural scientist, before he 
became an academic professor of philosophy with Husserlian inclinations. Thus he had to be careful not 
to discredit the objectivity of his earlier empirical-scientific results by his later methodologically solipsist 
philosophy. 
46 On the basis of some anti-platonist versus platonic-idealist considerations, Driesch refused to 'dedicate' a 
separate quasi-independent order-philosophical realm to the science of Mathematics. These arguments do 
not appear strongly convincing to me – Driesch simply 'feels' through phenomenological introspection 
that the realm of 'soul' appears as if quasi-independent and external, whilst the field of Mathematics does 
not appear to 'deserve' its own quasi-independent philosophical realm. To me it seems as if Driesch was so 
worried about being dubbed a 'Platonist' or 'idealist' by his contemporary academic community (as much 
 STEFAN GRUNER 417 
the I– has fabricated those thoughts for me and 'posited' them 'before' me, such that they are now my 
'pre-suppositions' in the wide sense of  that term", wrote Driesch.47 Moreover, this preparatory 
order-philosophical notion of 'soul' is at that point still independent from the scientific 
question concerning the two relations between 'soul' and consciousness (psychology) on 
the one hand, and 'soul' and brain (physiology) on the other hand, whereby also the 'I' 
and the 'soul' must not be conflated with each other. Only after all those foregoing 
considerations, said Driesch in Die Logik als Aufgabe, we may carefully and non-naively 
state that "if  I willfully wish to do so, then my 'soul' –or, alternatively, in nature-philosophical 
terms: my 'psychoid' or my 'acting entelechy'– is doing something according to which also my body is 
doing something or changes itself". This connection, however, remains a 'miracle' that can 
only be 'accepted' from the perspective of the philosophy of order which does not know 
any deeper-probing tools by means of which this 'miracle' could be further analysed 
anyhow. In that context Driesch also stated that the philosophical position of monism 
would be a desirable 'ideal' towards which any 'complete' philosophy of order should 
aspire – however: such a desirable monist well-ordering of everything can never be 
complete because the stream of appearances, to which the phenomenologically 'gazing 
I' is permanently exposed, contains undeniably many elements of 'randomness' which 
defy their once-and-for-all-fixed ordering. Thus, because of the non-eliminable 
presence of random contingencies, the gazing 'I' feels compelled to assume a philosophical 
position of Aristotelian dualism.48 Last but not least: is it possible at all for the 
phenomenologically gazing 'I' to break through the barrier of the 'as-if' that Driesch 
has so often and so strongly emphasized? Is it possible that the posited order-concepts 
have a genuine semantics, with genuine reference objects beyond the 'I'? Such 'meta-
physical' and 'meta-psychial'49 type of recognition would be able to 'explain' my-self to 
me, would be able to 'explain' to me the 'deep' nature of my processes of experiencing. 
However, both Driesch's Ordnungslehre and Die Logik als Aufgabe end with this possibility-
                                                                                                                                                                 
as he did not want to appear as a 'naive realist') that he shied away from applying his own method to its 
full consequence at that specific point concerning the ontological status of Mathematics. 
47 My own translation from the German original, wherein I have tried to replicate Driesch's pun with the 
German word 'Vorstellung' which is typically translated into English as 'imagination', not as 'pre-
supposition'. Alas, the Latin-English word 'imagination' completely lacks the connotation of something 
'standing' in front of me or 'before' me (or my 'inner eye'), which is clearly the intent of the German word 
'Vorstellung'. 
48 Note, however that this 'Aristotelian dualism' is still of a merely methodological (not: ontological) kind as 
long as the philosophy of order refrains from making any firm ontological assertions about an ego-
independent external reality. 
49 Driesch distinguished clearly between the two terms 'psychical' and 'psychological', and complained that 
their sloppy conflation has led elsewhere to much confusion, including many misunderstandings of his 
own philosophy. 
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question, without any attempt to answer it. 
CONCLUSION. 
In summary of this review of Leib und Seele it seems fair to make the following 
concluding remarks. Though Driesch is mainly known as a 'neo-vitalist' and is, as such, 
often associated with his early philosophy of life (bio-philosophy), substantial parts of 
Driesch's oeuvre are dedicated to the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, 
philosophy of 'logic' (in the widest possible pre-Frege'ian sense of the term), Husserl'ian 
phenomenology, philosophical epistemology, metaphysics, and the like. The reviewed 
book, Leib und Seele, belongs to that later part of Driesch's oeuvre, too – it is not a book 
in the field of bio-philosophy. Thereby Driesch distinguishes clearly between the two 
realms of 'soul' (mind) and 'nature' (body), because of this distinction he cannot simply 
be dubbed a 'psycho-vitalist'. However, this apparent dualism is not an ontological 
dualism with reference to any naive-realist external reality; it is a methodological 
dualism in the context of Driesch's pre-metaphysical 'philosophy of order' or 'logic' 
which we would nowadays rather call it a kind of philosophical 'semantics'. Hence, the 
order-philosophically stipulated notion of 'soul' may not be naively identified with the 
vitalist-Aristotelian 'entelechy' as an entity in and of the realm of 'nature' – although it 
might appear to the phenomenologically 'gazing I' as if it were so. Due to the 
phenomenological 'epoché' (as explained by Husserl) the 'gazing I' may not so quickly 
'jump to conclusions' about external reality beyond the 'gaze'. In this philosophical 
attitude of a methodological (not: ontological) solipsism, Driesch combines 
phenomenological introspections with formal-logical conclusions (often in Modus 
Tollens) throughout large parts of his book, Leib und Seele. The empirical un-observability of 
the invisible mind (soul, spirit, and the like) makes this philosophical undertaking very 
difficult, and Driesch's chosen method of reasoning does not appear as prima-facie 
absurd under such circumstances. Nevertheless the 'destructive' first part of Leib und 
Seele –written against older positions of 'psycho-physical parallelism' from the history of 
philosophy– appears more plausible and more convincing than the 'constructive' 
second part of Leib und Seele, in which Driesch had given himself the task of clarifying 
his own position against past views that had been refuted; to refute something with 
formal-logical rigour is always easier than coming up with something new that is not 
only new but also plausible and defensible. 
To present students of philosophy I can recommend Driesch book Leib und Seele 
because of its beautifully sober rigour of argumentation, which is painfully absent in so 
much of contemporary 'post-modern' philosophy in which 'impressions' and 'feelings' 
and mere opinions have very often been substituted for deep and genuine philosophical 
thought. To recent philosophers of  'trans-humanism', robotics and 'artificial intelligence' I can 
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recommend Leib und Seele for its un-broken relevance to the 'mysterious' question 
concerning the 'deep essence' of person-hood.50 To the entire community of philosophers 
I can recommend, for all these reasons, revisiting Driesch's philosophy, from various 
perspectives and vantage points, a century after its formulation. Perhaps Driesch did 
not find what he had been looking for – but a genuine seeker he surely was. 
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50 Already in 1972 the German theologian and philosopher of religion, Wolfhart Pannenberg, had 
remarked that 'personhood' can only be ascribed to something which is not entirely predictable or 
'computable' – vice versa: whatever is entirely predictable in residue-less determinism cannot be accepted 
as 'person'. This thought by Pannenberg of 1972, which currently is of great relevance in the field of 
'intelligent robotics',  appears as if it were an 'echo' of Driesch's Leib and Seele in which, too, the human 
person is eloquently circumscribed as something which is ultimately 'mysterious' (in Driesch's German 
original: geheimnisvoll). Even the apparently so ruthlessly neo-positivist logicist Wittgenstein found himself 
compelled to hint at a mysterious 'silence' in the final statement of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
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APPENDICES. 
For the sake of 'utility' for contemporary readers, I add the following appendices to the 
above review. These appendices provide a wider array of information on context, and 
are not in all cases specific to Driesch's Leib und Seele which was the topic of the review. 
A: Driesch's Historical Context shared with Phenomenology and Philosophy of Science. 
 
The reviewed book "Leib und Seele" (1916 / 1923) shares ideas with the following 
books: 
• With Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit" (1927):  Bergson, Hartmann, Husserl, 
Kant, Lotze, Rickert, Scheler, Simmel. 
• With Popper's "Logik der Forschung" (1935): Bergson, Husserl, Kant, 
v.Kries, Reininger, Stumpf. 
However, neither Heidegger (1927) nor Popper (1935) referred back to Driesch (1923). 
B: References to Other Authors in the Reviewed Book "Leib und Seele": Photo-Copy from the Original. 
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C: Driesch's Explicating Self-References in the Reviewed Book "Leib und Seele". 
Title (in alphabetical order) 
Year 
(ed.) 
Reference Information 
Das Problem der  
Organischen Form 
1919 
Schaxels Abhandlungen zur 
Theoretischen Biologie 3, pp. 57-
61 
Die Logik als Aufgabe: Eine Studie über die Beziehung 
zwischen Phänomenologie und Logik, zugleich eine 
Einleitung in die Ordnungslehre 
   1913 
Logische Studien über Entwicklung: Zweiter Teil 1919 
Sitzungsberichte der Akademie 
Heidelberg 18, pp. 16-- 
Ordnungslehre: Ein System der nicht-metaphysischen 
Teiles der Philosophie, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Lehre vom Werden 
   1912 
Philosophie des Organischen 
1909 (1st), 
1921 (2nd) 
German version of the  
Gifford Lectures 
The Problem of Individuality 1914 
Wirklichkeitslehre: Ein metaphysischer Versuch 1916 (1st), 
1922 (2nd) 
Wissen und Denken 1919 
 
D: Several Examples of Early Driesch-Reviews by English-writing Reviewers (during Driesch's own 
Life-Time). 
 
Reviewer Topic Year Publication Details 
anonymous The Problem of Individuality 1914 
The American Journal of 
Psychology 25/3, pp. 459-560 
Alexander, 
H.B. 
Der Mensch und die Welt 1929 
The Philosophical Review 38/2, 
pp. 189-194 
Alexander, 
H.B. 
Die sittliche Tat: Ein moral-
philosophischer Versuch 1929 
The Philosophical Review 38/2, 
pp. 189-194 
Calkins, 
M.W. 
The Crisis in Psychology 1926 
The Philosophical Review 35/4, 
374-377 
Cooley, W.F. The Problem of Individuality 1915 
The Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific 
Methods 12/6, pp. 161-164 
Cunning- 
ham, G. 
Mind and Body 1929 
The Philosophical Review 38/2, 
pp. 182-184 
Eastwood, The Science and Philosophy 1909 International Journal of Ethics 
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M.L. of the Organism 19/43 pp. 383-385 
Eastwood, 
M.L. 
The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism 
1910 
International Journal of Ethics 
20/4, pp. 494-498 
Farber, M. 
Professor Driesch on Philosophical 
Methods  
of Procedure 
1932 
The Journal of Philosophy 
29/24, pp. 655-663 
G.C.S. 
Selbstbesinnung und Selbsterkenntnis 
1941 
The Journal of Philosophy 38/9, 
pp. 249-250 
G.S. 
The History and Theory  
of Vitalism 
1921 Isis 3/3, pp. 439-440 
Garret, H.E. The Crisis in Psychology 1926 
The Journal of Philosophy 23/1, 
pp. 17-20 
Gerould, J.H. 
A Rational Vitalism –  
Die Localisation morphogenetischer 
Vorgänge 
1899 
The American Naturalist 
33/396, pp. 967-972 
H.L.F. 
Philosophische Gegenwartsfragen 
1934 
The Journal of Philosophy 31/1, 
p. 24 
Hughes, P. Mind and Body 1929 
The Journal of Philosophy 26/7, 
pp. 192-195 
Jennings, H.S. 
Driesch's Vitalism and Experimental 
Indeterminism 1912 
Science (New Series) 36/927, 
pp. 434-435 
K.M.D. 
The Case for and against Psychical 
Belief 1928 
The American Journal of 
Psychology 40/1, p. 151 
Larrabee, 
H.A. 
Die Philosophie der Gegen-wart in 
Selbstdarstellungen 1929 Books Abroad 3/2, pp. 162-163 
Lovejoy, A.O. 
The Meaning of Driesch and the 
Meaning of Vitalism 1912 
Science (New Series) 36/933, 
pp. 672-675 
Lovejoy, A.O. 
The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism 1909 
Science (New Series) 30/778, 
pp. 761-766 
McG., V.J. 
Die Maschine und der Organismus 
1936 
The Journal of Philosophy 
33/21, pp. 582-583 
McG., V.J. 
Die Überwindung des Materialismus 
1935 
The Journal of Philosophy 
32/24, pp. 668-669 
Morgan, T.H. 
The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism 
1909 
The Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific 
Methods 6/4, pp. 101-105 
Muscio, B. 
The History and Theory 
of Vitalism 
1914 
International Journal of Ethics 
25/1, pp. 122-123 
Muscio, B. The Problem of Individuality 1915 
International Journal of Ethics 
25/3, pp. 420-422 
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Neal, H.V. The Problem of Individuality 1915 
The Harvard Theological 
Review 8/3, pp. 408-412 
Oakeschott, 
M. 
Ethical Principles in Theory and 
Practica 1931 
The Journal of Theological 
Studies 32/127, pp. 326-327 
Oakley, H.D. 
Professor Driesch's Attempt to combine 
a Philosophy of Life  
and a Philosophy of Knowledge 
1920-1921 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, New Series 21, pp. 161-
179 
Oakley, H.D. 
Wirklichkeitslehre: Ein 
metaphysischer Versuch 
1921 Mind 30/119, pp. 346-353 
Perry, C.M. Der Mensch und die Welt 1929 Books Abroad 3/2, pp. 163- 
Perry, C.M. 
Ethical Principles in Theory and 
Practice 
1932 
International Journal of Ethics 
42/3, pp. 334-335 
R.M.Y. 
Driesch's Naturbegriffe und 
Naturteile 1905 
The American Naturalist 
39/466, p. 747 
Spaulding, 
E.G. 
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Beziehung zwischen Phänomenologie und Logik, 
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